Southern Christian: A Call for Extra-Constitutional Remedies, Legal Clinical Education, and Social Justice by Nicastro, Frances M.
Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy
Volume 15
Issue 1 Symposium on Legal Education Article 11
February 2014
Southern Christian: A Call for Extra-Constitutional
Remedies, Legal Clinical Education, and Social
Justice
Frances M. Nicastro
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndjlepp
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy at NDLScholarship. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy by an authorized administrator of NDLScholarship. For more information,
please contact lawdr@nd.edu.
Recommended Citation
Frances M. Nicastro, Southern Christian: A Call for Extra-Constitutional Remedies, Legal Clinical Education, and Social Justice, 15 Notre
Dame J.L. Ethics & Pub. Pol'y 333 (2001).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndjlepp/vol15/iss1/11
SOUTHERN CHRISTLAN: A CALL FOR EXTRA-
CONSTITUTIONAL REMEDIES, LEGAL CLINICAL
EDUCATION, AND SOCIAL JUSTICE
FRANCES M. NICASTRO*
INTRODUCTION
The aim of the law clinics and the dedication of their staffs
and students are indeed laudable. They should be com-
mended for their enthusiasm, hard work, and willingness
to devote time and effort toward altruistic endeavors. The
[district court] recognizes the pronounced degree of
anger, angst, and frustration they are experiencing as a
result of [the Louisiana Supreme Court's] alteration in the
[student] practice rules. To [the staff and students of law
clinics], such a change appears unfair. However, unfair-
ness does not always automatically rise to the level of
unconstitutionality. Indeed, it rarely does.'
In July 1999, the District Court for the Eastern District of
Louisiana granted a defendant's motion to dismiss a plaintiff's
complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be
granted, pursuant to Rule 12(b) (6) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, and for lack of standing.2 Southern Christian Leader-
ship Conference, Louisiana Chapter, et aL v. Supreme Court of the State
of Louisiana held that none of the plaintiff-constituencies stated a
claim upon which the court could grant relief when the plaintiffs
claimed that the Louisiana Supreme Court's amendment to the
State's student practice rule violated rights guaranteed by the
First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitu-
* B.S., 1998, Cornell University, School of Industrial & Labor Relations;
J.D. Candidate, 2001, Notre Dame Law School; 1999-2001 Thomas J. White
Scholar. I am grateful to my parents, Elizabeth F. and Charles J. Nicastro who
have encouraged me in all of my endeavors. I would also like to give heartfelt
thanks to Professor Lucy S. Payne for her comments and insights on the topic
of legal education reform, as well as her invaluable research assistance. Much
gratitude is also owed to Professor Thomas L. Shaffer, whose expertise in
clinical teaching inspires not only me, but all of the students who work in the
Legal Aid Clinic at Notre Dame.
1. Southern Christian Leadership Conference, La. Chapter, et al. v. Sup.
Ct. of La., 61 F. Supp. 2d 499, 513 (E.D. La. 1999) [hereinafter Southern
Christian].
2. See id. at 501.
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tion.3 The district court acknowledged that the movant's burden
for a 12(b) (6) motion was heavy.4 Nevertheless, the court found
the plaintiffs' complaint failed to set forth deprivation of any pro-
tected interest because "[n] onlawyers have no constitutional or
legal right to represent individuals or organizations in courts or
before administrative tribunals."5
Southern Christian teaches a couple of very important lessons.
First, the United States Constitution is not the ultimate arbiter of
what is fair. Instead, teachers, students, and citizens living in a
society dominated by law, politics, and economics, must strive to
utilize extra-constitutional means for achieving their laudable
goals. Southern Christian is a stark reminder that while the Ameri-
can legal system often protects those behaviors and social institu-
tions that are desirable, merely because a behavior or social
institution is desirable does not mean that it gains the law's pro-
tection. Some things are beyond its scope. Second, Southern
Christian highlights the success that law school clinical programs
can have in meeting the educational needs of law students, as
well as the legal needs of underserved communities. It provides
a springboard to consider whether, perhaps, law schools across
the country ought to strengthen, if not mandate, clinical legal
programs in their curriculum. These lessons are understood
only after careful examination of the Southern Christian opinion
and a structured review of what clinical legal programs have to
offer indigent clients, students of the law, and society at large.
In pursuit of this end, this Comment describes the facts and
circumstances that prompted the plaintiffs to bring suit in South-
ern Christian. Each of the plaintiff-constituencies' claims is
examined in an effort to show that the district court's opinion
was a proper application of constitutional law. Despite the
court's holding, there are multiple solutions that the plaintiff-
constituencies may pursue to achieve their ends in lieu of further
appeal.
Moving away from the specific circumstance in Southern
Christian, Part III of this Comment elaborates on the role of legal
clinics in today's society; explaining how clinical programs have
developed over time, can serve low-income clients, and can teach
students about career opportunities in the legal profession. Part
III ends by arguing that clinical programs, by creating an oppor-
tunity to serve underrepresented constituencies, benefit society
at large and all persons in the legal profession.
3. See id.
4. See id. at 513.
5. Id.
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Ultimately, this Comment concludes that law schools across
the country should re-evaluate their current curriculum and con-
sider expanding current clinical programs, perhaps even to the
point of instituting clinical requirements for their students.
Southern Christian is not a barrier to the pursuit of social justice;
rather, the opinion is a call to action, a call to move beyond the
narrow constitutional constructs of what ought to exist, and a call
to improve legal education.
I. SOUTHERN CHRISTIAv. IMPETUS TO THINK OUTSIDE THE Box
Southern Christian raises many issues for teachers, students,
and practitioners of the law, as well as for an ordered society,
whose continued existence depends on a base guarantee of social
justice for its people. Ought there exist restrictions governing
the practice of law by students who are not licensed practition-
ers? If so, how ought the courts and legislature promulgate these
restrictions? Which constitutional rights, if any, attach in these
circumstances?
A. The Facts
The case of Southern Christian provides a canvas upon which
to flesh out potential answers to these questions. Like many
other states,6 the Louisiana Supreme Court has adopted a stu-
dent practice rule to allow for unlicensed law students to assist
selected clients with their legal cases; Rule XX is entitled "Lim-
ited Participation of Law Students in Trial Work."7 The rule is
divided into many sections; sections 1, 4, and 5 provide the main
source of debate in this case.
Section 1 stands for three propositions. First, it is primarily
the responsibility of the "bench and bar" to supply legal services
to the public at large, including those persons who are unable to
afford such services. Second, to assist in that task, the Louisiana
court adopted Rule XX, allowing law students some ability to per-
form legal services. Third, Rule XX was also intended to
"encourage law schools to provide clinical instruction in trial work
of various kinds."8 Originally, the rule permitted eligible law stu-
dents to represent the State, its subdivisions, or any indigent per-
son; the Louisiana Supreme Court, however, subsequently
6. See David F. Chavkin, Am I My Client's Lauyer?: Role Definition and the
Clinical Supervisor, 51 SMU L. REV. 1507, 1546-54 (1998) for a list of citations to
student practice rules of individual states and a summary of the key features of
such rules.
7. Southern Christian, 61 F. Supp. 2d at 501 (citing LA. SuP. CT. R. XX).
8. Id. (emphasis added).
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amended the rule to include indigent community organizations
among the potential clients that students could represent.'
The controversy in Southern Christian arose when the Louisi-
ana Supreme Court amended the rule further. The court set a
standard by which to determine whether a potential client quali-
fies as "indigent"; section 4 allows representation of any "individ-
ual or family unit whose annual income does not exceed 200% of
the federal poverty guidelines established by the Department of
Health and Human Services." 10 This standard, however, does
not apply when the court finds that a client ought to qualify for
assistance from the clinic and so appoints or refers the client to
the clinic.11
Section 5 of the amended rule requires that indigent com-
munity organizations certify, in writing, the inability to pay for
legal services; such writing is subject to inspection by the Louisi-
ana Supreme Court.12 The amended rule sets forth two addi-
tional requirements for a community organization to qualify as
indigent. First, at least 51% of the organization's members must
be eligible for legal assistance under section 4.13 Second, the
court also requires the organization to provide information to
the staff of the clinic that shows the organization "lacks, and has
no practical means of obtaining, funds to retain private
counsel."14
The enhanced restriction upon indigent community organi-
zations would ultimately cast a pall on the amendments. In fact,
these amendments were imposed after the success of one com-
munity organization, with the assistance of a legal clinic organ-
ized at Tulane Law School, in preventing a chemical facility from
locating in its area.1" Tulane Environmental Law Clinic
("T.E.L.C.") represented St. James Citizens for Jobs & the Envi-
ronment ("St. James") in an effort to prevent Shintech Corpora-
tion from constructing a chemical facility in the area. 6 The
community group, St. James, opposed Shintech Corporation's
proposed location for two reasons. First, the facilities posed risks
to the health of local inhabitants, as well as to the environment.
Second, the town was already supporting a disproportionate
share of chemical facilities that posed similar environmental and
9. See id





15. See id. at 501.
16. See id.
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health risks. 17 T.E.L.C. filed objections with the Environmental
Protection Agency, as well as to the courts arguing that air per-
mits granted by the Louisiana Department of Environmental
Quality ("L.D.E.Q.") violated a Presidential Executive Order on
environmental justice, as well as Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
1964.18 Subsequently, Shintech Corporation located
elsewhere.' 9
The plaintiffs in Southern Christian alleged that business and
political leaders, dissatisfied with a loss of business revenue,
exerted pressure on Tulane University, as well as on the Louisi-
ana Supreme Court to tighten regulation on student practice.2"
Whether this casts a pall upon the Louisiana Supreme Court's
decision to amend the student practice rule is open to debate.2 '
17. See id See also Peter A. Joy, Political Interference with Clinical Legal Educa-
tion: Denying Access to Justice, 74 TUL. L. REv. 235, 243 (1999) (explaining that
the "location for the proposed plant was an area with eleven existing chemical
plants and over 130 other industrial plants known as 'Cancer Alley,' a predomi-




21. See id. Judge Fallon, in dicta, admitted "in Louisiana, where state
judges are elected, one cannot claim complete surprise when political pressure
somehow manifests itself within thejudiciary." Southern Christian, 61 F. Supp. 2d
at 513. See alsoJoy, supra note 17, at 240, where the author asserts that "It]he
amendments to the student practice rule were triggered by business groups and
politicians unhappy with the successful legal work of clinical law students and
faculty at the Tulane Environmental Law Clinic (TELC)." The author further
asserts that the business and political constituencies utilized extralegal remedies
to effectuate their goals; "[t]he strategy that ultimately proved most effective
was direct lobbying of Louisiana Supreme Court justices during ajudicial cam-
paign year by business groups and politicians, many of whom had supported
the justices during their previous campaigns." But see Sam A. LeBlanc III, Debate
Over the Law Clinic Practice Rule: Redux, 74 TUL. L. REV. 219, 224 (1999). The
author stated that while the Shintech matter may have been a proximate cause
for the amendment to the practice rules, it was not the sole cause:
Other activities of the TELC over the course of many years provided
substantial fuel for the eventual fire. For instance, law clinic practi-
tioners had been involved in objecting to a number of facilities being
expanded in the state, had lobbied on the issue of an environmental
'scoreboard' as a prerequisite for the industrial tax exemption histori-
cally given to business to encourage capital development in the state,
and fought against planned infrastructure improvements, such as the
Industrial Canal Locks, for many years. The bases for the objections
or positions were perceived by many to be merely pretextual. The
organizations represented by the TELC were perceived as sham orga-
nizations created strictly for the purpose of opposing projects or as
local organizations affiliated with national organizations that could
well afford to pay for legal representation.
20011
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Possible economic and political motivations aside, the central
issue before the Louisiana District Court was whether the claim-
ants had any grounds upon which to sustain a claim that the
amendments to the practice rule violated provisions of the First
or Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.
B. The Legal Questions
Plaintiffs asserted eight specific bases for relief.2 2 The dis-
trict court's opinion tackled the claims of each plaintiff-constitu-
ency in turn. There were four constituencies including clients of
T.E.L.C., a donor of financial support to T.E.L.C., the professors
affiliated with T.E.L.C., and the students who participated in
T.E.L.C.
1. The Client-Plaintiffs
Ten community organizations claimed that the new clinic
regulations deprived them of the ability to speak, associate, and
petition the government freely and that the disclosure require-
ments infringed upon their right to collective activity because
such disclosure had the tendency to expose their members to
retaliation, thereby creating a chilling effect upon a member's
desired association. 23 "In essence, the client-plaintiffs' complaint
[was] that the manner in which Rule XX constrict[ed] the opera-
tion of law clinics interfer[ed] with [the community organiza-
tions'] ability to exercise their constitutional rights in a legal
forum."2 The community organizations' argument rested upon
the fact that they could not express their concerns in a legal
forum without representation by counsel, which was limited by
Rule XX.
25
The district court then faced the initial question of whether,
in a civil context, a right to be represented by counsel attached.
The district court reiterated that "no such right [to counsel]
exists [for the community organizations] in civil cases."26
In an effort to support their claim, the plaintiffs relied upon
the principle set forth in In re Primus.2 7 Namely, "representation
of public interest groups organized for the purpose of collective
22. See Southern Christian, 61 F. Supp. 2d at 503.
23. See id. at 506.
24. Id. at 507.
25. See id.
26. Id. at 506 (citing Bass v. Perrin, 170 F.3d 1312 (11th Cir. 1999);
United States v. Sardone, 94 F.2d 1233 (9th Cir. 1996); Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc.
Servs. of Durham County, 452 U.S. 18 (1981)).
27. 436 U.S. 412 (1978).
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political expression is amenable to First Amendment protec-
tion."28 In re Primus held that a First Amendment right attached
when an attorney advised a lay person of her legal rights and
subsequently sent such lay person notice that free legal assistance
was available from a nonprofit organization, with which the attor-
ney was affiliated.29
Just as the rule limiting the attorney's solicitation of an indi-
gent client in In re Primus fell under First Amendment protec-
tions, perhaps the disclosure requirements now levied on the
community organizations ought also to fall under First Amend-
ment protections, such that the restrictions must cede to First
Amendment rights of association. In both instances, a party was
facing a legitimate regulation: limited solicitation by attorneys
and limited disclosure requirements for clinic participation. And
in both instances, the moving parties sought to have those
requirements cede to broader First Amendment rights of
association.
The key distinguishing feature between the two situations,
however, is the posture of the parties. In re Primus dealt with a
licensed attorney approaching potential clients. The adversarial
legal system is premised on rights of association between licensed
attorneys and clients. In Southern Christian, however, the district
court dealt with unlicensed law students forming representa-
tional relationships with clients. Unlicensed law students have
no associational rights in a legal forum except for those granted
by a state court's discretion and guidance."
In fact, In re Pimus supports the district court's opinion.
The holding of In re Primus assured that a licensed attorney was
able to associate with indigent clients. Similarly, Rule XX allows
licensed attorneys in the clinical programs to solicit and exercise
First Amendment associational rights with any indigent client,
should they so choose.
28. Southern Christian, 61 F. Supp. 2d at 507 (discussing the plaintiffs' reli-
ance on In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978) and NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415
(1963)).
29. In re Primus, 436 U.S. at 421.
30. See LeBlanc III, supra note 21, at 231. The author explains that one of
the most important questions presented in Southern Christian is fundamental:
who ought to be eligible to provide clients with legal assistance? The author
asserted that in "a day and age when anybody can do anything, this might seem
to be profoundly irrelevant. On the other hand, to individuals who seriously
respect the law, it is [an] essential [inquiry]." Id.
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2. The Donor-Plaintiffs
Also relying on First Amendment freedoms, a donor to
T.E.L.C. claimed that Rule XX impinged his right to "express
and advance his beliefs. '3 1 The district court noted that the
donor's position "seemed to be that the burden at issue was not
the imposition of a particular spending limit, but the way in
which Rule XX controlled how funds were spent."32 The district
court stressed that Rule XX did not prevent the donor from con-
tributing to his choice of community organizations directly. "At
most, the donor-plaintiff s objection [was] that Rule XX
restrict[ed] his ability to channel funds to their ultimate recipi-
ents, the community groups, in the manner he [saw] fit."3 3 The
district court explained that none of the cases submitted by the
plaintiffs supported this contention.3 4
Plaintiffs cited, among other cases, Colorado Republican Fed-
eral Campaign Committee v. Federal Election Commission, in support
of their contention. In Colorado Republican, the United States
Supreme Court held that expenditures for radio advertisements,
although reflecting poorly on opposing party's candidate, were
spent independently of any specific candidate's campaign
scheihe and not pursuant to any general or particular under-
standing with a candidate. 6 In this circumstance, the Court held
that a political expenditure provision could not limit the amount
spent on such independent radio advertisements because to do
so would violate First Amendment rights.3 7
In Southern Christian, however, the plaintiff was free to
donate unlimited contributions directly to the legal clinic of his
choice. Although Rule XX restricted a clinic's choice of clien-
tele, a donor was free to contribute the funds directly to the com-
munity organization of his choice. Accordingly, no First
Amendment right was denied to the donor.
31. Southern Christian, 61 F. Supp. 2d at 508.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. See id. at 509 (explaining that the court did "not read any of the cases
cited by Plaintiffs to stand for the proposition that a donor has a constitutional
right to demand that funds he supplies be expended in a certain way, particu-
larly when the complained of regulation burdens the conduit (i.e., TELC), and
not the ultimate recipient" of the donation).
35. Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., et al. v. Fed. Election
Comm'n., 518 U.S. 604 (1996).




The law professors claimed that the amendments to Rule
XX inhibited their ability to "engage students in... the types of
cases which afford the best possible teaching and learning oppor-
tunities. They insist[ed] that this burden[ed] their constitu-
tional rights to freedom of association with students, freedom of
speech, and academic freedom."3 ' Reviewing the facts of the
case, the district court was "of the opinion that, at its core, the
professor-plaintiffs' grievance [was] that the Amendments
deprive [d] them of the freedom to instruct and employ law stu-
dents in whatever fashion they desire[d]. " " The law faculty
could not object to any impingement upon their own right to
advance any theory or idea in the classroom. The terms and
effect of Rule XX created no such restriction. The law faculty
instead claimed that Rule XX "intrude[d] upon a derivative
right, one drawn from the supposed freedom of law students to
obtain a clinical education in the manner that is most pedagogi-
cally beneficial."
40
In response, the district court explained that Rule XX
merely placed a restriction on the law faculty's ability to employ a
student in a representative capacity. Rule XX did not prevent
the law faculty from representing or soliciting clients of their
choice, or from employing students in any nonrepresentative
capacity. As a matter of principle and legal process, the district
court stressed that "[i]f it is within the province of the Louisiana
Supreme Court to erect boundaries to student practitioners'
authority to appear in court, then it is also appropriate for the
same limitations to govern how professors direct those stu-
dents."4 The district court, therefore, found the professor-plain-
tiffs to have suffered no cognizable injury.42
Indeed, the authority that the professor-plaintiffs presented
to support their claim was readily distinguishable from the case
at bar. Professor-plaintiffs cited Edwards v. Aguillard4 "for the
proposition that courts apply exacting scrutiny to legislative
attempts to 'interfere with the ability of teachers to educate in
the manner they deem appropriate."'" In Edwards, the Supreme
Court of the United States ruled on whether a legislative act,
38. Southern Christian, 61 F. Supp. 2d at 509.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 510.
42. See id.
43. Edwards et al. v. Aguillard et al., 482 U.S. 578 (1987).
44. Southern Christian, 61 F. Supp. 2d at 509 (also citing Regents of the
Univ. of Calif. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978)).
20011
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requiring schools to teach creation science if and when evolution
theories were taught, violated the Establishment Clause.45 The
Court upheld the court of appeals decision that the "actual
intent [of the requirement] was 'to discredit evolution by coun-
terbalancing its teaching at every turn with the teaching of crea-
tionism, a religious belief."' 46
In applying a three-prong test to hold that the statute did
violate the Establishment Clause, the Supreme Court explained
that "[s] tates and local school boards are generally afforded con-
siderable discretion in operating public schools."47 In this sense,
the professor-plaintiffs gained support for their claim that any
legislative infringement upon their teaching methods must be
scrutinized. The case at bar, however, did not have the direct
relationship that existed in Edwards. In Southern Christian, Rule
XX did not restrict the subject matters that professors might
teach. It merely limited the ways in which law faculty could
assign students to clients participating in the legal clinic.
Through an indirect limit on the professors' ability to teach stu-
dents by assignment, the historical principles behind judicial
constraints on the ability of non-lawyers to practice law justify the
incidental restraint.
Precedent in Louisiana4" explains why it is proper and desir-
able that the legislature and the court have a hand in determin-
ing eligibility requirements for the practice of law. The
Louisiana Supreme Court explained:
The Legislature may, in the exercise of its police power,
and in the performance of its duty to protect the public
against imposition or incompetence on the part of persons
professing to be qualified to practice the so-called learned
professions, fix minimum qualifications or standards for
admission to the bar. But the courts of justice have,
besides that interest, another and special interest, in the
character and qualifications of the members of the bar-
who are considered in this country as officers of the courts.
In fact, a proper administration of justice depends as
largely upon the conscience, competence and conduct of
the members of the bar, as upon the work of the men on
the bench.49
45. Edwards, 482 U.S. at 583.
46. Id. at 582.
47. Id. at 583.
48. Ex parte Steckler et al., 154 So. 41 (1934).
49. Id. at 45.
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The district court supported its decision by describing the
absurd consequences of providing law professors a carte blanche
to employ tactics of their choice to educate their students.50 But
a simpler analogy exists that illustrates more poignantly the pol-
icy behind licensing requirements. First, imagine if First Amend-
ment rights inhered to give educators in other professions
unlimited discretion in their teaching assignments. Then, apply
this principle to a scenario in which a medical student is partici-
pating in an outpatient clinical program. Merely because her
professor believes that the student would benefit from unfettered
discretion to prescribe certain medicines and perform certain
medical procedures does not, and should not, prevent the gov-
erning medical board from interceding and placing reasonable
restrictions upon this discretion. If it did, patients' medical care
might be sacrificed to the misjudgment of an unlicensed medical
student. Similarly, while the court recognizes the utility of stu-
dent practice in legal clinics, it also must balance this learning
tool against the broader societal protections at stake, that is, that
clients ought to have competent representation.
4. The Student and Student-Organization Plaintiffs
The plaintiffs agreed that there does not exist any funda-
mental right of a non-lawyer to practice law; the plaintiffs also
agreed that courts possess the inherent power to regulate both
lawyers and clinical law student practice.51 The students argued,
however, that the power to regulate the clinical law student prac-
50. See Southern Christian, 61 F. Supp. 2d at 510, where the opinion states:
Taken to its logical conclusion, the right the faculty implores this
Court to recognize is one that bestows upon professors unfettered dis-
cretion to instruct students, not only in the classroom but also in the
.real-world" context, in whatever manner they choose so long as the
professors feel it is the most pedagogically beneficial. Under this the-
ory, a professor supervising a criminal law clinic might determine that
the best educational experience for students would be to first learn
how it feels to be a criminal and to spend time incarcerated. If the
Louisiana Supreme Court then amended Rule XX to prohibit student
practitioners from any activity that might constitute a crime, this
would automatically burden the professor's constitutional rights.
While this may actually be true in a purely theoretical sense, it is clear
that the State could constitutionally proscribe such behavior. In this
case, the Rule XX Amendments more narrowly define the students'
already limited privilege to engage in what would otherwise be the
unauthorized practice of law. To place restrictions on such a privilege
burdens the professor's rights no more than the above hypothetical




344 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 15
tice must not violate the United States Constitution.5" "The stu-
dents and student organizations object[ed] that Rule XX
infringe[d] their constitutional rights because it detract[ed]
from their educational opportunities and burden[ed] their abil-
ity to associate and advocate for expression of collective views"; in
this way, the students argued that they had suffered "a concrete,
particularized injury to a protected interest."
53
In response, the district court focused almost exclusively on
the propriety of the income restriction created by Rule XX. The
court explained that "[c] ourts routinely uphold the utilization of
income levels as criteria for conditioning certain public bene-
fits."54 The students tried to distinguish their case by showing
that "all of [the district court's cited] decisions somehow
involved the use of public funds," but the Tulane clinic received
only private funds.55 The district court found the distinction
unpersuasive; in sum, the court explained:
Although the Louisiana Supreme Court does not offer
public funding for legal services for the poor, through the
mechanism of Rule XX it does supply "labor" for the provi-
sion of legal services to the poor. By allowing students to
represent indigents, the State is essentially offering free
assistance through the students themselves, rather than
through public funds. By analogy, then, the State should
be permitted to employ the same guidelines for determin-
ing who will receive these limited public resources.56
The district court went on to explain why the restriction con-
formed to both constitutional law and the policy behind the stu-
dent practice rule. "Rule XX has always had a public service
orientation, one geared towards supplying needed legal services
to those least able to pay for them. Without any income criteria
whatsoever for determining who might qualify for aid, it is con-
ceivable that the poor themselves might not receive any legal
assistance."
57
What is interesting is that the opinion lacks any discussion of
the due process rights that may have required that the Louisiana
Supreme Court provide students either with a pre- or post-
amendment opportunity to be heard. Though the district court
52. See id. at 511.
53. Id. at 510.
54. Id. at 511.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 512.
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opinion cited Bass v. Perrin5" for the proposition that "there is no
constitutional right to legal representation in a civil case,"59
review of the case raises an interesting question about due
process.
In Bass, the Eleventh Circuit asked whether the decision to
deprive a prison inmate of outdoor exercise time could hold
potential due process implications.6" The Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment protects against deprivations of
"life, liberty, or property without due process of law."61 Since a
prisoner is already deprived of his or her liberty "in the ordinary
sense of the term," it is difficult to determine whether process is
due when there are alterations made to the already sanctioned
deprivation of liberty.
62
The Eleventh Circuit opinion set out two circumstances in
which process may be due for a subsequent deprivation of liberty.
First, "when a change in a prisoner's conditions of confinement
is so severe that it essentially exceeds the sentence imposed by
the court," process may be due.63 Second, "when the state has
consistently given a certain benefit to prisoners (for instance, via
statute or administrative policy), and the deprivation of that ben-
efit 'imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in
relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life,"' process may be
due.6 4 "In the first situation, the liberty interest exists apart from
the state; in the second situation, the liberty interest is created by
the state."65
In Bass, the Eleventh Circuit found that the inmates had a
liberty interest in outdoor exercise time. This constituted a lib-
erty interest created by the state. 66 Ultimately, the Eleventh Cir-
cuit found no due process infringement because the inmates
who were deprived of exercise time were provided with, and took
advantage of, a full appeals process.
One might question whether the law students in Southern
Christian could rely on a similar principle. The students could
argue that Rule XX constituted a state-created property right, a
right of students to represent individuals and organizations
58. Bass v. Perrin, 170 F.3d 1312 (1lth Cir. 1999).
59. Southern Christian, 61 F. Supp. 2d at 506.
60. Bass, 170 F.3d at 1315.
61. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
62. Bass, 170 F.3d at 1318.
63. Id. at 1318 (citing Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995) and
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under a broad and fluid criteria of indigency. Then, the students
could assert that the subsequent amendment of Rule XX diluted
this right.
While the district court explained that "[n]onlawyers have
no constitutional or legal right to represent individuals or organi-
zations in courts or before administrative tribunals," the district
court admits that "Rule XX authorize[d] law students in clinics
to do so [if only] on a limited basis."6 7 An analogy may be drawn
to the inmates who had no constitutional or legal right to liberty,
in the ordinary sense of the word. Once the penal system
allowed them circumscribed freedom, such as daily outdoor exer-
cise time, the system had created a liberty interest. Perhaps, the
Louisiana Supreme Court created some property interest in stu-
dents' ability to practice law, albeit in a defined manner.
While no one disputes the Louisiana Supreme Court's ability
to alter those rights,68 it might be useful to inquire whether the
court acted properly in the manner by which it altered those
rights. If a property right attached to those students who enjoyed
the more broad terms of former Rule XX, what process was due
in altering that rule? In an article describing the controversy,
one author pointed out the peculiar fact that there appeared to
be no laws or court rules in Louisiana that required the court to
open its amendment process to the public.69 "There were no
public hearings or a public comment period concerning the pro-
posed changes to the student practice rule, nor were there any
public proceedings or deliberations of the Louisiana Supreme
Court over the requests for changes to the student practice
rule."7 °
If there was no appeal process, then it appears tenable that
the student-plaintiffs may sustain a due process claim against the
Louisiana Supreme Court. In fact, there did appear to exist a
viable appellate process. The students could have appealed to
the political process. As the district court pointed out, the plain-
tiffs' efforts "would more properly [have been] focused on the
political rather than the legal system." 7' The district court ended
its opinion by declaring that "Rule XX Amendments are not
vague or overly broad, and they represent a constitutional exer-
cise of the Louisiana Supreme Court's authority."72
67. Southern Christian, 61 F. Supp. 2d at 513.
68. See id. at 510.
69. SeeJoy, supra note 17, at 247.
70. Id.
71. Southern Christian, 61 F. Supp. 2d at 513.
72. Id. at 514.
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II. THE FIRST LESSON OF SOUTHERN CHRISTIAN, EFFECTIVE
ALTERNATIVES TO LITIGATION ABOUND
It is interesting to see professors and students of the law
focus almost exclusively on constitutional protections to shield
them from hardship that the amendment to Rule XX might work
upon them. There were, and are, alternative channels by which
the plaintiffs could have achieved their desired end. For exam-
ple, the plaintiffs could have proposed a referendum or asked
that Rule XX be amended to include public comment proce-
dures. Also, the plaintiffs could have requested that the Louisi-
ana Supreme Court consider amending Rule XX to authorize,
for the first time, the providing of services to non-profit organiza-
tions, with a separate list of eligibility requirements. 73 Southern
Christian is a call for legal scholars to recognize that the Constitu-
tion is not the only measure to ensure fairness. The case is also a
testament to the success of legal clinics. It raises the question of
how legal clinics fit into the present and future of legal
education.
Before such a conclusion can be reached, however, the
needs of various constituencies must be examined. Can legal aid
clinics serve as effective educational tools for law students? Do
legal aid clinics serve clients in an effective fashion? What impact
will more widespread utilization of legal aid clinics hold for
society?
III. THE BIGGER PICTURE: THE SECOND LESSON OF SOUTHERN
CHRISTIAN IS THAT CLINICAL LEGAL EDUCATION IS
EFFECTIVE AND UPON INVESTIGATION SERVES
NOT ONLY ITS CLIENTS, BUT LAW
STUDENTS AND SOCIETY AT LARGE
What follows is an explanation of how clinical legal educa-
tion has developed in the United States. This Comment then
explains how clinical education effectively educates students,
effectively serves indigent clients, and meets broader goals of
social justice.
A. Development of Clinical Legal Education in the United States
When researching the development of clinical education in
American law schools, two themes dominate. First, legal clinics
are used as tools for achieving professional competency goals.
Second, legal clinics are used as vehicles of social justice for
73. See LeBlanc III, supra note 21, at 234.
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underserved communities. Inquiry into both reveals that these
roles overlap in many ways and are not mutually exclusive.
Clinical legal programs were initially a response to Harvard
Dean Christopher Columbus Langdell's casebook method of
legal instruction."4 The implementation of the casebook method
replaced apprenticeship requirements for law practice in the late
1800s." 5  Legal clinics were employed to supplement the
"casebook method of legal instruction and to offer law students
experiential learning opportunities similar to the medical school
model while providing free legal services to indigent clients.
'"76
At its birth, clinical legal education focused predominantly on
legal instruction, but also contained a social justice component.
It is interesting that while the implementation of legal clin-
ics posed a substantial question of teaching methodology, most
of the clinics were student-inspired. 77 For example, in 1893, "stu-
dents at the University of Pennsylvania Law School established
what they called a 'legal dispensary,' borrowing from the termi-
nology of medical education."71 "Beginning a decade later, clin-
ics were organized at several law schools: the University of
Denver, Northwestern University, and Harvard."
79
The courts stepped in and contributed, in a substantial way,
to the discourse on social justice, when the Supreme Court held
that a defendant had a constitutional right to legal representa-
tion in capital cases pending before state courts.8 ° Eventually,
the right to representation was extended to federal capital cases,
felony defendants in state courts, and finally, a right to counsel
was recognized for all defendants who risked imprisonment.
81
Soon after, the social justice aspect of clinical legal educa-
tion was brought to the forefront during the 1960s and 70s, a
time of social revolution and student activism.82  "Unprece-
dented opportunities" for the development of law clinics devel-
oped during this time period due to widespread student
74. SeeJon C. Dubin, Clinical Design for SocialJustice Imperatives, 51 SMU L.
REv. 1461, 1463 (1998). See also Robert MacCrate, Educating a Changing Profes-
sion: From Clinic to Continuum, 64 TENN. L. REv. 1099, 1100 (1997).
75. See Dubin, supra note 74, at 1463.
76. Id.
77. See MacCrate, supra note 74, at 1103.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. See id. at 1108 (discussing Powell v. Alabama, 237 U.S. 45, 71-72
(1932)).
81. See generally id. at 1108-09 (discussing Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458,
463 (1938); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344-45 (1963); and,
Argensinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 30-31, 37 (1972)).
82. See Dubin, supra note 74, at 1465.
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demand, as well as financial support from private institutions.A
For example, in 1968 the Ford Foundation committed $12 mil-
lion, distributed over a ten-year period, to help institute clinical
education as a part of law school curriculum. 4 Ford created the
Council on Legal Education and Professional Responsibility
(C.L.E.P.R.) comprised of representatives from the Association
of American Law Schools (A.A.L.S.) to administer his program. 5
"CLEPR emphasized 'public service aspects of professional
responsibility, as opposed to the more operational aspects of law-
yers' ethics.' CLEPR explicitly mandated that funded programs
be not only 'educationally sound and professionally relevant' but
also 'socially progressive.' "6 The president of C.L.E.P.R.
explained it this way:
So far as society is concerned it sorely needs the services
which only law students and their professors can provide in
the great mass of individual cases involving the 'little man'.
... Fighting forjustice for an individual is essential for the
individual and for society if it is to continue to be a society
worth living in. If lawyers don't do this, who will? And the
regular participants in the machinery ofjustice need incen-
tives to spruce up their own performance and keep the
machinery up to date. One of the best incentives would be
the regular appearance on the scene of a fresh crop of law
students.
8 7
In the wave of this development, the American Bar Associa-
tion (A.B.A.) revised its standards for accreditation of law
schools. Recognizing developments in clinical practice and pro-
fessional responsibility, the 1973 standards set three objectives
for all students: instruction in subjects in the core curriculum;
training in professional skills; and instruction in the legal
profession.
8 8
Over time, the practice of law has become more complex. A
process of professional differentiation has narrowed the scope of





87. Id. at 1466 (quoting COUNCIL ON LEGAL EDUC. FOR PROF. RESP.,
CLINICAL LEGAL EDUCATION IN THE LAW SCHOOL CURRICULUM 3 (1969)).
88. See MacCrate, supra note 74, at 1123 (quoting A.B.A. SEC. OF LEGAL
EDUC. AND ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, LEGAL EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONAL DEVEL-
OPMENT: AN EDUCATIONAL CONTINUUM 262-63 (1992) [hereinafter MACCRATE
REPORT]).
89. See id. at 1124-25.
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response, the A.B.A. Section of Legal Education and Admission
to the Bar convened two national conferences. The first confer-
ence was held in October of 1987. Participants at the conference
"sought to assess the stage and state of professional skills instruc-
tion and clinical legal education."90 "Five months later, in March
of 1988, the A.B.A. convened a second national conference at the
University of Virginia in Charlottesville. This conference con-
nected the law schools directly to the profession at large and was
entitled Legal Education for a Changing Profession."91 The key-
note address focused not only on the skills-based learning that
law schools must employ, but also on the basic tenet of social
justice that attorneys owe to underserved communities:
[The speaker hoped] that the law schools would seize the
opportunity which [was] theirs to help shape the profes-
sion and from the outset of law studies seek to create in
students an awareness that they are headed for a profes-
sion that not only expects its members to have certain
learning, skills and competence, but expects them volunta-
rily to subscribe to a common body of values and assumed
responsibilities which justify the continuation of the profes-
sion's exclusive right to engage in the practice of law.
92
Subsequently, the A.B.A. commissioned a task force to cre-
ate a "conceptual vision of the lawyering skills and professional
values that lawyers should seek to acquire."93 The statement of
skills and values included problem solving, legal analysis and rea-
soning, legal research, factual investigation, communication
(both oral and written), counseling, negotiation, litigation and
dispute resolution procedures, legal organization and manage-
ment, and resolution of ethical dilemmas.94
In pursuit of these ends, the A.B.A. Task Force Report stated
that clinical courses (both simulated and live-client) "occupied
an important place in the curriculum of virtually all A.B.A.-
approved law schools."95 In 1996, the A.B.A. revised accredita-
tion standards requiring law schools to offer adequate opportuni-
ties for instruction in professional skills. "This might be
accomplished through clinics or externships."96 Left with the
mandate that law schools must advance some sort of "hands-on"
90. Id. at 1125.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 1125-26.
93. Id. at 1127.
94. See id.
95. Id. at 1129.
96. Id.
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education for their students, it remains open to debate which
form the education should take.
Given the history of clinical education, it is clear that it is
aimed not only at increasing the skills of law students, but also
towards meeting the goals of indigent persons. Since there is
also an overarching need for lawyers to provide legal services to
underrepresented communities in society, it appears that clinical
education is the most viable solution to both the legal education
and social justice quandary. To substantiate this claim, however,
two things must be established. First, clinical programs do, in
fact, serve a valuable educational purpose for students. Second,
there exists a need for representation that can be met, in part,
through the use of clinical programs.
B. Good for Students: Legal Clinics are a Useful Educational Tool
for Adult Learners and May Offer an Opportunity for
Career Guidance
1. Learning Tools: Real World Practice, Ethics, Multi-Cultural
Awareness
Clinical legal programs provide extremely useful learning
tools for students. First, as legal education presently stands, most
law students find themselves bored by the casebook teaching
method. One empirical study revealed that "the amount of time
spent studying and preparing for class, the frequency of partici-
pation in informal discussions, the degree of interest in law
school work, the degree of difficulty experienced with classwork,
and students' emotional reaction to law school" decreases dra-
matically over time.97 "Only 20% of... students surveyed found
their fifth semester to be intellectually stimulating."98
The Socratic method, while teaching "students how to ana-
lyze the law in a written appellate opinion, a form of the law [law-
yers] will often confront in practice," fails to provide students
with a real world context in which to solve problems.99 In con-
trast, clinics introduce students to real world hypotheticals, with
real world clients, and real world interaction between opposing
parties and supposedly neutral judges and magistrates. Further-
more, supervision by professors opens the door to potential men-
97. Christopher T. Cunniffe, The Case for the Alternative Third-Year Program,
61 ALB. L. REv. 85, 103 (1997).
98. Id. at 103-04.
99. Jennifer Howard, Learning to "Think Like a Lauyer" Through Experience,
2 CLINICAL L. REv. 167, 172 (1995).
2001]
352 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 15
tor relationships that may not have developed without the
programs.100
In addition, clinical programs offer an avenue to teach law
students about social justice. One commentator on the subject
stated:
Although law school graduates as a group exert enormous
influence on public policy, lawyers individually do not nec-
essarily acknowledge this role. The law school-imbued
notion that the practice of law is a technical matter of
value-free representation of a client's best interests-with-
out regard to societal implications-prevails among prac-
ticing lawyers. Legal education needs to confront this
narrow vision of legal advocacy not only because it is in
error, but because critical analysis of one's role in the
social and legal systems should be an essential part of any
higher education experience.
101
Because of the unique way in which adults learn, legal clinics will
likely meet this educational goal.
As adults, law students learn in a different way from chil-
dren. The following are four characteristics of adult learners: (1)
adults see themselves as independent learners-they choose to
interpret information for themselves, as opposed to relying on an
authority figure's interpretation; (2) adults tend to draw upon
their own experience in interpreting information; (3) adults'
readiness to learn is increased when the learning is related to
"developmental tasks," that is, those steps necessary for them to
perform their social role; and, (4) adult learners are more
inclined to learn only the information that will readily be applied
to situations at hand, as opposed to learning for some future
date.10 2 "In other words, adults approach learning with a 'prob-
lem-centered' frame of mind."'
For this reason, experiential learning opportunities, such as
clinical programs, are those most likely to affect the knowledge
of adults. As experience-based programs, clinical programs offer
a "significant challenge of playing the lawyer role for the first
time . . .that has been found to lead to learning episodes of
100. See generally Suzanne J. Levitt, Submission of the Clinical Legal Education
Association to the Supreme Court of the State of Louisiana Concerning the Review of the
Supreme Court's Student Practice Rule, 4 CLINICAL L. Rv. 571 (1998).
101. Fran Quigley, Seizing the Disorienting Moment: Adult Learning Theory
and the Teaching of Social Justice in Law School Clinics, 2 CLINICAL L. Rv. 37, 41
(1995) (footnotes omitted).
102. Id. at 47.
103. Id. (footnote omitted).
SOUTHERN CHRISTIAN
personal significance. '"104 One author cites a Chinese proverb
that explains this theory quite accurately: "Tell me, I forget.
Show me, I may remember. Involve me, and I understand." '
Essentially, by placing law students in a role to help underserved
persons in society, those underserved constituencies become
"real"; they become a legitimate concern to which attention
ought to be paid. This ethical obligation of lawyers is then
understood at the very start of the lawyer's career.
In addition, clinical education can help to develop multicul-
tural sensitivity in law students. It is difficult for casebooks or
simulation exercises to replicate the experience of working
under the supervision of faculty to represent clients whose eco-
nomic class, ethnicity, sexual orientation, physical or mental abil-
ity, or other significant personal characteristics differ from those
of the student.
In such a setting, clinical students not only develop general
practical skills of legal representation, they also increase
the breadth of their knowledge about culturally diverse cli-
entele located outside the social and economic main-
stream. In many cases, such representation provides an
excellent vehicle for developing a sensitivity to general
problems of client relations and professional
responsibility. 106
2. Career Guidance
Furthermore, clinics provide an opportunity for students to
make informed career choices. A study performed at the Univer-
sity of Denver College of Law revealed that participation in a
clinic reinforced students' prior intentions to handle public
interest cases by ninety-six percent.10 7 Additionally, 57% of stu-
dents who had not originally intended to practice any sort of
public interest, changed their mind as a result of the clinical
course.
108
Where the questionnaire granted students the opportunity
to comment on the reason for the change in their inten-
tions, they acknowledged a 'personalization' of the plight
104. Id. at 50.
105. Id. (footnote omitted).
106. Charles R. Calleros, Training a Diverse Student Body for a Multicultural
Society, 8 LA RAZA L.J. 140, 148 (1995).
107. See Sally Maresh, The Impact of Clinical Legal Education on the Decisions
of Law Students to Practice Public Interest Law, in EDUCATING FOR JUSTICE: SOCIAL
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of the poor, a realization that many of their clients needed
representation through no fault of their own, a recogni-
tion that the integrity of the judicial system is dependent
on equal access to representation regardless of individual
resources, and that the 'right' to counsel is not an inaliena-
ble right.10 9
Furthermore, the other 43% who did not change their minds did
not indicate failure of the program; rather, they were students
who made an informed decision to continue with other pursuits
after gaining exposure to a new career possibility. The next
question is whether an effective learning tool also effectively
serves clients' needs.
C. Client Benefits: Legal Clinics Provide Effective Assistance to
Low Income Persons
Before advocating that clinics be more widely implemented,
or even a mandatory tenet of each law school's curriculum, it is
important to query whether these programs serve the best inter-
ests of indigent clients. In Southern Christian, it appears that
T.E.L.C. succeeded in preventing a business from establishing a
plant that would have negatively impacted health and environ-
ment in the proposed locale.110
This case aside, few studies address the standard of legal
assistance afforded by student practitioners. In an effort to fill
this gap, one article compared student performances in the
Criminal Defense Clinic of New York University School of Law
with the representation of attorneys for indigent defendants in
the Criminal Court of the City of New York ("institutional
defenders").1 1 1 The study employed an outcome or result-based
comparison, as well as an "effort expended" comparison. In both
instances, the results demonstrated that students achieved better
outcomes and expended more diligent effort for their clients.1 12
The study focused on product, as well as process.1 1
109. Id. at 164.
110. See discussion supra Part I.A.
111. See Steven Zeidman, Sacrificial Lambs or the Chosen Few?: The Impact of
Student Defenders on the Rights of the Accused, 62 BROoL L. REv. 853 (1996).
112. See id. at 919.
113. See id. at 863.
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1. Outcomes Analysis Revealed That Students Achieved More
Favorable Results for Their Clients Than Institutional
Defenders
The study examined two stages of representation-the
arraignment and the post-arraignment." 4 In both stages, the
results indicate that students fared better than licensed attorneys.
"Nearly half of the clients of institutional defenders pleaded
guilty at [the] initial court appearance, as compared with 27% of
the students' clients."115 Furthermore, "[i]n those cases where
the defendants pleaded guilty, students negotiated more pleas to
reduced charges, and were slightly more likely to have secured a
non-jail sentence." 6 Lastly, "[of] those cases that involved a bail
determination (i.e., the case was not disposed of by plea or dis-
missal), students obtained a higher rate of release on
recognizance." 117
In cases not resolved at arraignment, the clients of students
pled guilty less often (37%) than the clients of institutional
defenders (53%).118 In those instances where the clients of stu-
dents did plead guilty, those clients were substantially more likely
to plead to a lesser charge and receive a noncustodial sen-
tence.'1 9 "Students' clients were 20% more likely to have their
cases dismissed . . .and were half as likely as clients of institu-
tional defenders to receive bench warrants for failing to return to
court."120
2. Lawyer Performance Analysis Also Revealed the Success of
Student Practitioners
Not surprisingly, the favorable outcomes achieved by the stu-
dents overlapped the fact that the effort expended by the stu-
dents proved to exceed that expended by institutional defenders.
But comparing lawyering process with performance was difficult
because it is a subjective, qualitative evaluation. "In order to
assess lawyering performance, it [was] necessary first to delineate
the component parts of lawyering .... Several surveys of practic-
ing attorneys [had] attempted to find out what skills they regu-
larly employ[ed] in their law practices." '21 The study ultimately
114. See id. at 867.
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employed six foci to guide evaluation: interviewing, fact investiga-
tion, negotiation, counseling, problem solving, and litigation.
1 22
a. Interviewing
While students fared better than institutional defenders in
fact investigation, negotiation, counseling, and problem solving,
the students did exceptionally well in the area of interviewing.
This is salient because "ABA Standards state that 'defense coun-
sel should seek to establish a relationship of trust and confidence
with the accused.' Commentators and courts have also recog-
nized the pivotal nature of the attorney-client relationship. The
time to begin trying to build rapport is in the initial interview of
the defendant.'
2
There are many reasons for student success in this regard.
First, and probably most fundamental, was that the students did
not have tight time constraints upon which to end the initial cli-
ent meeting. 121 "Defendants consistently reported that their
conversations with their [institutional defenders] were rushed
and brief."1 25 Furthermore, "[f]aw students [were] better situ-
ated to gain the trust and confidence of their clients. Unlike the
appointed counsel scenario... student attorneys [were] obliged
by the terms of the student practice order to solicit a potential
client's consent to student representation."1 26 In effect, the
defendant chooses her advocate, as opposed to accepting
appointed counsel. The defendant then feels that she is an
active participant in the representation.
b. Fact Gathering
The successful interview also sets the stage for effective fact
gathering. "If an attorney has a relationship of trust and confi-
dence with his or her client, he or she is more apt to learn the
critical facts."' 27 Furthermore, "students' lack of familiarity with
courthouse routines liberates their approaches to information
gathering." '128
122. See id. at 888.
123. Id. at 890 (footnotes omitted).
124. See id. at 892.
125. Id. at 892.
126. Id. at 894.
127. Id. at 901.
128. Id. at 903 (explaining that in one case, "a student moved for the
names and addresses of the prosecution's witnesses. The judge granted the
motion readily and noted her surprise that other defense attorneys did not
make the same request. In another case, a student asked a judge to sign sub-
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c. Litigation Skills
Similar findings go for all other foci, except for litigation
skills. "Trial advocacy skills present perhaps the greatest chal-
lenge for students. ' 129 This is one shortcoming that clinical pro-
grams have worked towards improving and must continue to do
SO.
CONCLUSION
In Southern Christian Leadership Conference, Louisiana Chapter,
et. al. v. Supreme Court of the State of Louisiana, the district court
properly held that the plaintiffs had failed to state a claim upon
which the court could grant relief. First, it is clear that there is
not, and as a matter of policy there should not be, an inherent
right of an unlicensed law student to represent clients in a legal
proceeding. Second, to the extent that Louisiana courts, and
courts across the nation, have provided students with such a
right, it should continue to be within the courts' purview to
define such rights. So long as the students are afforded an
opportunity to express their concerns about those restrictions, as
in Southern Christian, there is no due process violation.
The lessons held by Southern Christian are twofold. First, for
the plaintiffs who will surely be disappointed with the court's
holding, the lesson is to look beyond the United States Constitu-
tion in search of fairness. Other channels to effect change
abound and should not be ignored. Second, for law schools
across the nation, Southern Christian highlights the positive
aspects that clinical programs hold for law students, under-
represented constituencies, and society at large. That students,
teachers, and practitioners of the law would grasp these lessons
may be a preliminary step towards truly achieving justice for our
society.
poenas for various police reports. Much to the astonishment of everyone in the
courtroom, the judge agreed.").
129. Id. at 917.
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